Abstract: This paper focuses on the two-way relationship between China and the international economic system. China's embrace of the global institutions and their rules and norms helped guide its spectacular economic growth and integration into the world economy.
The profound transformation underway in the world economy passed another milestone in August 2010 when the Japanese government released its second quarter GDP numbers. These indicated that China's economy had overtaken Japan's in size to become the world's second largest economy after the United States. With India, the two most populous countries on the planet are successfully integrating into the world economy while the large advanced economies struggle with what is likely to be years of below-potential growth following the global financial crisis. So far, this shift in the center of economic gravity is remarkable in that, while not without bilateral tensions, relationships among the world's major states are both peaceful and collaborative in promoting common interests and collective action.
China's sheer size and dynamism are moving it to the top of many rankings (Box 1). It is the world's largest creditor and accumulator of foreign exchange reserves, the largest goods exporter and the largest importer of iron ore, copper, potash, timber products and Saudi crude oil.
Some Chinese companies are now the world's largest by market capitalization. For thirty years it has been the world's fastest-growing economy, advancing more rapidly than anyone anticipated to parity with the United States. 1 It is at the heart of the globalization of production with all major manufacturers of consumer goods and durables located there. Significantly, Chinese see themselves as returning to the center of the world economy, a position China held for centuries between 1300 and 1820 (Maddison 2006 ).
[Box 1 here]
China's size creates external expectations of its global leadership role which are frustrated by factors that every Chinese economist knows well (Box 2). China is still poor, measured by per capita income; its population is aging and the number of new labor market entrants is already shrinking. Thirty years of rapid growth has generated serious income and regional inequalities and environmental degradation is a rising public concern. The dash for jobs generated by industrial growth cannot be sustained. Correcting the imbalances is not an easy task since powerful interests will have to compensated which have relied on underpriced factor inputs (energy, land, capital and the environment).
[ Box 2 here] Underlying these challenges is a unique mix of state and market institutions. The 120 central state owned enterprises are huge conglomerates with complex ownership structures interlinked with state power, for example. And the financial sector is bank-dominated and government-owned while its monetary system is shaped by a strong political commitment to exchange rate stability.
We have therefore a complex tapestry to apply to consideration of the subject of China and global governance. The relationship is very much two way. Looking back, China's remarkable development was inextricably tied up with decisions to rely on the norms and rules as well as the advice and technical assistance from the institutions. China's embrace of the global institutions and their rules helped guide its economic success in pulling millions of people out of poverty, creating millions of modern sector jobs and deepening its integration into the world economy. Tackling its relative poverty is a key driver in the story of China's economic ascent.
Located in the neighborhood of the ‗Asian miracle' and facing a Malthusian crisis in the 1970s
following the upheavals of Mao's class struggles, the communist party leadership moved pragmatically to restore balance between population and economic production. Jobs became a central objective. As local experiments with decentralized rural production showed success governments moved to reform incentives throughout the country to draw in potential opponents who benefited from the status quo. Domestic institutions were then changed in ad hoc fashion that continues to this day. Industrial production benefited from foreign knowhow and capital, particularly from China's diaspora and East Asian neighbors. In the late 1990s the radical restructuring of the state production sector opened the way for non-state firms which now account for more than 80 percent of industrial production. The World Bank became involved following Deng Xiaoping's meeting with Robert McNamara around 1980 (Kent 2007; Zoellick 2010 ). The 15-year negotiation to join the World Trade Organization was instrumental in
China's acceptance of the global rules of the road and a major driver of domestic policy reforms to change the planned economy, its institutions and its managers into more market-oriented ones.
The strategy has had a spectacular payoff.
Looking forward, China's impact on the global economic order is still an open question.
Its economic size and dynamism make it both ‗systemically significant' and increasingly a political force to be reckoned with. Will that reckoning be peaceful? The Chinese people are strongly supportive of China once again taking its rightful place in the world and reversing two hundred years of conflict and humiliation by foreign powers. How will China participate in the world's economic and political institutions as it integrates into world markets? As its size and confidence grow will its behavior influence their goals and operations, for worse or better? More in its own image?
We are reminded by historians that earlier economic transitions caused upheavals.
Although peaceful, in the transition from British to US hegemony after the First World War US economic policies took advantage of liberal UK trade policies. Japan's rapid investment-and export-led growth after the Second World War caused major economic imbalances in the 1980s
as the economy achieved greater systemic significance. The way these imbalances were dealt with by Japan and its major economic partners echoes in the minds of policy makers in addressing the international imbalances underlying the global financial crisis. The tendency to blame yen appreciation as the cause of Japan's decades-long stagnation is to misread history.
The real culprits were mistakes in monetary policy, weak regulatory institutions (Corbett and Ito 2010; Posen 2010 ) and failure to implement the 1986 Maekawa report on economic restructuring.
China's economic and security relationships with the United States, still the pre-eminent power in both hard and soft power terms and the architect of the post-war global order, is central to China's conduct in the global order. The hard power relationship both drives and is constrained by the realities of economic interdependence. Even as they cooperate they mistrust each other. As we see in a later section the United States accommodates China's rise but what will happen if China does not support the rules and norms of the system of which the United
States is the architect?
The next section explores the prevailing framework of global economic governance, how it might change to accommodate China and how these ideas accord with those expressed in
Chinese discourse and analysis. The third section examines China's approach to the provision of key public goods in the G20, the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), as well as related regional institutions and the climate change framework negotiations. China's behavior towards its Asian neighbors, which until two hundred years ago it dominated peacefully through political and commercial relationships, will be a factor shaping the global order. The final section draws conclusions based on the evidence and examines both the reasons for and future implications of China's growing assertion of its own interests.
Perspectives on Global Governance
What is the meaning of global governance, as established by the western countries? What changes are contemplated to accommodate China? What are Chinese perspectives on these issues? At its most abstract global governance is the rule making and exercise of power on a global scale by entities working within organizations functioning on democratic principles and accountability (Keohane 2002) . These entities include governments, corporations, individuals, civil society organization and other non-state actors. Joint action in these institutions is based on common interests and values; members agree to abide by common rules and shared work of the institutions. The institutions in turn are accountable to their members.
Global economic governance, the main focus of this paper, was established in the postwar period through the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank), WTO, the Basel financial institutions centered at the Bank for International Settlements and the G7 leaders' summits established by French and German leaders in 1975 . In these institutions governments cooperate to produce non-rivalrous ‗international' public goods from which no one can be excluded and which no government can produce by acting on its own. More broadly these public goods include peace, law and order, open and efficient markets, economic and financial stability, freedom from poverty or communicable disease and a clean environment.
As economies have become more interdependent, governments have cooperated in promoting and maintaining economic and financial stability --even coordinating economic decision making --in theory to modify national policies in recognition of international economic interdependence. This definition of economic policy coordination can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the extent to which governments alter policies either in response to peer pressures or in recognition of the consequences of spillovers. This does not mean governments give precedence to international over domestic goals. But coordination or cooperation is a way of expanding choices available to national policy makers because it gives them influence over policy choices of other cooperating governments. Further, while collective action involves ceding some national sovereignty, in deciding to cooperate governments exercise sovereignty (Dobson 1991) .
[Box 3 here]
Relations among national governments can be seen as ranging along a spectrum from conflict to supranational integration where governments set common policy in a forum to which they have ceded significant authority (Box 3). In between, independent policy setting reflects purely national objectives, while cooperating governments act on enlightened self interest, taking potential spillovers beyond national borders into account -even engaging in policy bargaining with their peers and coordinating policies. In its broad sense, economic cooperation characterizes the Bretton Woods institutions, created by the western alliance after the Second World War and observing principles of governance common to the founding democracies: market competition, transparency and the rule of law and respect for human rights. Since the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, however, these institutions have come to be regarded as exclusive clubs suffering from democratic deficits; representing a shrinking share of economic activity and slow to respond to the growing systemic significance of China, India, Russia and Brazil whose policies and performance increasingly spill over onto their neighbors and trading partners.
Nevertheless these principles are still the reference point in external views of China's participation in the international order. Some optimists who are persuaded by China's historical role and the size of its economy predict a powerful China acting independently and reshaping the order. China asserts its own values, returning to the tributary system in East Asia, inevitably challenging the United States for global pre-eminence (Jacques 2009) . Others see China's future transformation into an urban, green and innovative society as having a similar impact: an assertive China securing natural resources, building soft power, taking a higher profile in international organizations and changing the rules of the game (Economy 2010) .
Pessimists discount China's future influence because of the exigencies of rising economic inequality, environmental degradation and the weak financial system which will preoccupy it at home for the foreseeable future, just as domestic preoccupations have caused it to turn inward in the past (Friedman 2009; Pei 2009; Bardhan 2009 ). Intermediate positions argue that most modern societies now accept that a stable world order is based on key western principles of democracy, the rule of law and social justice. The challenge in the post-unipolar world is to apply these principles in pragmatic ways through partnerships with emerging powers that recognize cultural differences (Mahbubani 2008) . China accepts and participates in this world order, seeing itself more as a counter balance to other major powers and primarily focused on its huge domestic economic challenges (Dobson 2009a ).
Too often the popular debate is framed in zero-sum terms. Political and security analysts tend to conflate economic with hard power and assume relationships among great powers are zero-sum. Yet economic power is not simply the absolute size of an economy but the ability to get others to change their positions through persuasion and economic threats such as freezing bank accounts, distributing bribes and exerting other forms of influence that others emulate (Nye 2004 (Clinton 2010a ) and elsewhere has elaborated this view, emphasizing that US leadership will rely on partnerships based on principles of shared responsibility. The effectiveness of the traditional top-down approach is declining in effectiveness and legitimacy in this more diverse world of changing threats. The Bretton Woods institutions are being pressed towards universal membership and consensus decision making, similar to the United Nations, to increase their legitimacy. But the fallouts of consensus decision making are reduced ability to undertake internal reforms, let alone take effective and timely action.
Reforming the Global Institutions
As well, global leadership is in flux. American leaders' commitments to continued global and regional leadership notwithstanding, the United States must become a ‗frugal' superpower as it addresses it huge long-term fiscal imbalance. On climate change, the most important collective issue of our time, it is ‗missing in action' as its response is driven more by domestic than global interests. With no other power moving to fill the leadership vacuum other nations must grapple with a power ‗disequilibrium': the need for strong leadership to deal with rising pressures on the global commons is widely recognized but there is no single dominant state willing or able to deliver. As Secretary Clinton argues, partnerships, networks and mini-lateral agreements are parts of the way forward. The US role in the outcome will be crucial, but not decisive. In sum, there is a willingness to accommodate China in the global institutions, a few ideas for further reform -all of which come from the west. What are the Chinese perspectives on these matters?
Chinese Perspectives on the Global Order and China's Role
There is no single ‗China Inc' voice on China's role, rather many voices in both the security and economic spheres. There are many fewer voices on global governance. One evident cleavage in Chinese debates is between the military, intelligence and security communities and the economic managers and internationalists. The former are increasingly vocal about China's growing clout and favor more assertiveness, particularly at home and in the region. There is also public support for the proposition that the Chinese economy is sufficiently robust, demonstrated by its successful navigation of the global crisis, that China should be more assertive in pursuing its own interests and reverse its history of humiliation in the region. Economic managers and internationalists are much more cautious. Yes, China's size and rise imply it should take more global responsibility but it does not yet have the capabilities to do so. It is still a developing nation with major modernization challenges and economic institutions that are still evolving.
In the early years after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, China was hostile to global institutions and governance. Although a founding member of the United Nations, the existence of both Beijing and Taipei administrations caused a UN debate lasting until 1971 over who should take the seat. Membership in the scientific and technical organizations followed, including in the World Bank and the IMF. In all these difficult negotiations, China's self-interest and considerations of sovereignty (particularly with respect to Taiwan's membership) were front and center (Kent 2007:33-64) . By 1978 when its economic transformation began the Chinese leadership recognized that in the age of globalization there was little choice but to integrate into the international economy -and its institutions -in order to modernize itself.
China is a member of the Security Council but its role in the United Nations reflects its multi-faceted view of itself: -back‖ as a major power, still-poor but pursuing its own interests which may include counter-balancing the United States on such security interests as Iran and North Korea. Chinese scholars also describe China as a regional power with limited global interests; one that will take on a greater cooperative profile in East Asia. There is an explicit acceptance in
China of a central precept of East Asian development that regional political stability has made it possible to focus exclusively on economic development. Wealth, not bullets, is the route to power and influence. As a growing regional economic power it will exert its political influence there and open its markets to serve as the regional locomotive by making opportunities for its neighbors (Zhang and Tang 2005) .
In 2006 President Hu Jintao set forth China's principles for scientific development in an harmonious world (hexie shijie) that include independence, self reliance and peaceful coexistence in which differences are respected and security is based on mutual trust, benefits, equality and cooperation. These principles were proposed as an alternative vision of global governance and imply several criticisms of western principles:
The status quo order is -undemocratic‖; the democratic deficit in international institutions, dominated by western nations and serving their own interests, (and tolerating US unilateralism) should be reduced;
North-South economic disparities are growing; wealthy advanced nations practice double standards in which they expect concessions from developing nations that are not reciprocated. These disparities should be reduced through -shared development and common prosperity‖.
Countries have differing histories and cultures and therefore differing political systems and economic models. The international system should observe diversity and tolerance and countries should not interfere in each other's affairs but seek -reconciliation amid differences‖.
Cross border crises and conflicts should be resolved through cooperation rather than the use of force (Wang and Rosenau 2009 ).
The sub-text of these principles is that the United States should become a normal country, abide by international law itself, be more ‗democratic' in treating China as an equal and, along with other large western economies, open its markets more to developing countries and rely more on the UN system in multilateral diplomacy. There is much in common with western reliance on international rules and understandings and respect for universal values of justice, fairness and mutual assistance. Yet China's own perspective persists of itself as a developing country, lacking in the capabilities to lead in the world order (some call this a ‗small country mentality') which frustrates expectations that as a major power it will observe, even enforce, global rules and norms and modify national policies in recognition of interdependence.
Global Economic Governance and China's Role
The 2008-09 financial crisis highlighted this interdependence. When demand dried up in the OECD countries as households and businesses repaired their balance sheets the effects of the recessions cascaded through global supply chains to the export-led Asian economies. Asia's financial institutions, having reformed since the 1997-98 crises, escaped the worst of the financial crisis but Asian producers suffered heavily from the disappearance of final demand in US, European and Japanese markets.
The severity and global spread of the crisis opened a window for a long overdue and pragmatic overhaul of global summitry. A meeting of G7 leaders in the depths of the crisis in November 2008 would have been irrelevant -and unthinkable. With G20 finance ministers and central bank governors having formed a G20 forum after the Asian crisis elevating G20 meetings to the leaders' level was an obvious choice, and one supported by China. Significantly it was leaders who managed the crisis, using the international institutions to implement their decisions.
At the Pittsburgh summit in 2009 leaders formalized their agenda around a macroeconomic framework for balanced and inclusive growth, financial regulatory reforms, resuscitating the global trade negotiations and inclusive growth extending to smaller developing countries.
At their initial meetings G20 leaders tasked the IMF with providing appropriate liquidity to requesting countries and reforming its governance better to reflect the changing shape of the global economy; the WTO was tasked with concluding the Doha round, while the World Bank was tasked with addressing poverty in developing countries. The Financial Stability Forum's membership was expanded and upgraded to a Board.
The G20
With the G20 largely being created to include China as an equal partner what has been China's role? As one of the world's largest trading nations and the largest creditor it has been in the hot seat over its managed exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves accumulation far beyond prudent levels to cover import requirements ( Figure 1 and Table 1 ). Since 2008 China's role has been constructive. It has advanced a proposal for the SDR to become the world's supersovereign reserve currency, a reform that would serve its own as well as the global interest.
Exchange rate policy, which re-pegged the currency to the US dollar in the depths of the 2008 crisis, moved modestly in 2010 towards greater nominal flexibility in the face of intense external pressure which continued through to the November summit in Seoul. 2 China's effective response to the pressure was ‗no, now would not be in our interests'. But China remained engaged in the rebalancing issue, participating in the ‗enhanced' Mutual Assessment Process to promote external sustainability,' a process with a collective goal but which gives each government discretion in how it contributes to that goal.
[ Figure 1 and Table 1 At the outset of the Doha Round China argued that it had ‗already given' in the accession talks; this was a reasonable position at the time but now a decade has passed. As a major beneficiary of the regime it is reasonable to expect China to provide a new offer such as its recent proposal to join the government procurement agreement, nine years after it promised to do so.
Instead China has focused on regional trade agreements (RTAs). Most of China's regional trade is in goods and much of the liberalization is tariff reductions; difficult non-tariff barriers receive less attention yet they matter to services trade. 5 Studies also show that subregional agreements produce outcomes that are inferior to region-wide RTAs or to agreements among the large countries (Park and Cheong 2008) . Quantitative studies have shown that the liberalizing gains increase with the size of the agreement (Kawai and Wignaraja 2009 ).
With the exception of its bilateral FTA with New Zealand, China's RTAs reveal more of an interest in foreign policy objectives than economic liberalization ( Table 2 ). The China-ASEAN agreement (CAFTA) was a friendly initiative aimed at increasing bilateral market access with East Asia's -core‖ economies. It took effect on January 1, 2010 and covers an estimated $4.5 trillion in trade volume with 90 percent of goods to be traded tariff-free.
Problems lie ahead, however. Usually the gains from trade are realized through specialization, differentiation and increases in intra-industry trade. But the structure of China's two-way trade, particularly with Indonesia and the Philippines, is very similar and therefore competitive rather than complementary. In contrast, these countries gain through complementary trade with Japan, South Korea and the United States.
[ Table 2 here] The resulting 9-country negotiation will figure prominently in the lead up to the US-hosted APEC leaders' meeting in 2011 in Honolulu when President Obama has committed to complete the negotiation. This negotiation is also envisaged to create a baseline in its standards and comprehensiveness with which other applicants will be expected to comply. The ultimate benefits of the TPP will depend on other large Asian economies joining (USTR 2009) and it remains unclear how the TPP or the other proposals for a regional FTA will play out.
Thus China is a major beneficiary of the open world trading regime but is doing little to maintain the system. It could re-energize the Doha Round by joining the government procurement agreement, engaging in sectoral liberalization agreements and pushing the services liberalization talks (services now account for 40 percent of GDP). In return, the United States and the advanced economies should respond to China's desire to be recognized as a market economy and end the humiliating annual compliance reviews (Hufbauer and Lawrence 2010) .
Within the region, China also faces contradictions between its economic size and dynamism and its domestic preoccupations. Developing countries feel the competitive pressures of its managed currency; it is foot dragger on region-wide liberalization which all studies show provides the largest overall benefits. This issue is made more complex because the smaller economies benefit from access to the US market and see its presence as a hedge against Chinese dominance.
Investment Liberalization
Compared to the trade regime China is asserting its interests more strongly with respect to direct investment and the treatment of foreign nationals in China, raising questions about whether (Table 1 ) and sovereign wealth funds who managed more than $2 trillion in 2006 (Truman 2007) . Central banks led by the US Federal Reserve Board were also active in bilateral swap arrangements to address short term liquidity problems.
G20 leaders resuscitated the Fund by restoring its resources to $1 trillion and encouraging it to set up new facilities to help countries solve credit problems. 8 The IMF streamlined its lending framework and conditionality, providing adjustment support through short term lending facilities through which countries qualifying on an ex ante basis can access loans immediately as well as other credit lines on precautionary bases without conditions.
9
IMF governance reform agreed at the Seoul G20 summit in November 2010 will make
China the third-largest shareholder. How will China use this increased clout? As it assumes more power in governance will it support enhanced IMF staff objectivity in surveillance of members' economic performance? Will the United States and China be willing to move discussions of their macroeconomic interdependence into the IMF? Or will China favor a regional institution, possibly with different rules, where it has even more clout?
China has both dragged its feet and proposed reform. The slow adjustment of its nominal exchange rate (Figure 1 ) has drawn strong US criticism with some arguing that ‗rejection of a flexible exchange rate' is a direct challenge to the international monetary order (Bergsten et al 2008:17) . China was also one of the last (along with the United States) to agree to an IMF evaluation of its financial system through the Financial Sector Assessment Program. In contrast, China actively pursued governance reforms to raise its voting strength and adopt the SDR as a super-sovereign reserve currency to provide an alternative way to reallocate its foreign exchange reserves. Central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan (2009) argued that current arrangements relying on a single national currency are flawed because of the potential for conflicts between domestic goals and international responsibilities. As the dollar-based system has become more volatile, developing and emerging market economies have diverted foreign exchange reserves from more productive uses to self-insure. Using the SDR in this way would allow large holders of US government securities to diversify their holdings within the IMF thereby avoiding exchange market volatility (Bergsten 2009 ). But the proposal has gained little traction because of the entrenched position and convenience of use of the US dollar for both market participants and governments.
Regionally, China has been active in multilateralizing the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMIM), the regional emergency financing mechanism set up in 2000 as bilateral currency swap agreements among the members of ASEAN+3. The 1997-98 crisis crystallized awareness that much of East Asia's high savings were intermediated in the world's financial centers rather than in the region. Initiatives to address this issue include regional bond markets for local currency issues and pooling foreign exchange reserves by central banks to increase liquidity. In 2010 the CMI swaps, which now totaled $120 billion with 80 percent contributed by China, Japan and South Korea, were pooled into the CMIM common fund, supported by governance and voting structures to make it accountable to its members. Like the IMF, CMIM will provide short term emergency financing to its members. A surveillance unit is to be in place by early 2011.
Whether its methodology will be consistent with that of the IMF remains to be seen. If it is, governments will share information about their economic policies and performance with the surveillance unit and agree to an early warning system to prevent future crises.
Within China, changes are in train for domestic reasons that will bring about some alignment with the global rebalancing objective. China's investment-driven export-led growth is unsustainable. The economy needs to rebalance towards greater reliance on domestic demand.
The heavy emphasis on investment is supported by under-priced inputs for energy, land, capital and the environment (Kuijs 2009; Huang 2010) . Capital is priced by the central bank which manages interest rates to support exchange rate stability for exporters and which provides the government-owned banking system with generous and riskless spreads (Dobson and Kashyap 2006; Dobson 2009a; Prasad 2009 ). At the same time the -disinterested authoritarian capitalism‖ that has delivered China's material prosperity has entrenched interest groups that could block reforms to transfer wealth, undermine the impartiality and block reforms to respond to popular demands for greater political pluralism (Yao 2010 ).
The 12 th Five Year Plan proposed in October 2010 signaled the Party's collective awareness of the need to restructure the economy. Changes in domestic policy are expected to increase imports and the weight of consumption relative to investment and exports in total GDP with policies to boost employment and household incomes through higher wages, more labor mobility, higher public spending on rural infrastructure, health, education and pensions, better access to market finance for employment-creating SMEs and deregulation of service sectors currently dominated by large state monopolies.
There is recognition that such key prices as the exchange rate and interest rates cannot be managed indefinitely and that more flexibility is required. The central bank characterizes abandoning the US dollar peg as a continuation of the managed exchange rate regime adopted in 1994 (Hu Xiaolian 2010) . A more flexible exchange rate (assuming it would appreciate) would facilitate domestic economic rebalancing. Rebalancing is also necessary to ensure the safety of In summary China is not only engaged in IMF governance but has proposed a fundamental reform. It has said ‗no' to outside pressures for exchange rate appreciation but has participated in the G20's enhanced surveillance process which relies on IMF analysis. There are two tests of China's recognition of the external impacts of its domestic policy choices: one is its willingness to be transparent in the regional surveillance within the CMIM where it is a major shareholder, and the other is political: will the 12 th Plan focus on structural reforms survive the onslaught of vested interests? Greater exchange rate flexibility would facilitate the structural shift towards consumption. A market-determined exchange rate is also essential to the development of the deep and liquid market-based financial system and the more efficient use of capital that are necessary if China's is to become an economic power with international influence commensurate with its modern and complex economy.
Development Finance and the World Bank
The World Bank and the regional multilateral development banks provide development finance through loans and grants and technical assistance to developing countries to promote poverty reduction and economic development. The network of banks is more decentralized than the IMF system and the regional banks are largely run by countries in the regions. The World
Bank is governed by its shareholders but developing countries criticize it for reflecting the development priorities imposed by the advanced countries rather than those of the developing The 12 th Plan will contain obligatory targets to increase renewable energy supplies to 15 percent of the primary energy mix. Industrial policies will encourage green production (such as hybrid and electric autos) and on the supply side an investment package of much as $740 billion in an energy development plan over the next decade is reportedly planned.
China claims and receives little credit for such initiatives. It also hesitates to lead because of its commitment to the developing country coalition. Its detractors decry the reliance on industrial policies and criticize its profile among developing countries as detracting from a global
regime. Yet in many ways China's behavior is reminiscent of the sometimes eccentric views of
French leaders that push a ‗French' perspective and position on international issues. In China's case such a stance puts the advanced industrial countries on notice that they cannot always expect to have things their way.
Asian Regionalism
Within the Asian region China's charm offensive saw it play a relatively passive role in regional institutions while competing with Japan, India and the United States outside. It faces determined efforts by the ASEAN ‗core' economies to divert this competition into regional cooperation in the nascent regional financial and trade institutions. But progress on the 2015 target for an East
Asian community proposed by the 2001 Vision Group is slow; decisions rely on consensus and activity is focused more on members' interests than on advancing common rules or standards.
Trading patterns are lop-sided in regional production networks with China a major importer from its neighbors but competing directly with some of them in final goods markets. accommodate a more assertive and powerful China. Whether this will be a positive sum relationship depends on both governments and will presage their roles in the global institutions.
Conclusions and Looking to the Future
Is China willing to change its policies in recognition of international interdependence? The evaluation in this paper indicates that the answer varies with the forum:
‗Yes' in the G20 where President Hu Jintao has played a constructive role. Even on the imbalance issue, whose formulation China does not accept, China has helped shape a broader cooperative process aimed at the collective goal while according flexibility to governments as to their contributions.
‗No' in the WTO where despite the benefits of accession and now one of the world's largest trading nations, China has not offered leadership necessary to conclude the Doha Round; nor does it observe WTO principles of non-discrimination toward foreign investors and producers.
‗Yes' in the IMF where China has pushed on governance issues and participated in the broad goals and approach to imbalances, but said ‗no' on exchange rate adjustment pressures from peers.
‗Yes' to the World Bank, as a supporter of the regime but increasingly competing for influence through parallel but bilateral aid programs in developing nations, particularly those with abundant natural resources.
‗Shape the regime to reflect developing country concerns' at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. At home, China has taken major unilateral initiatives to define energy intensity reduction targets, develop renewable energy sources and push as a first-mover into green technologies and processes. Yet it receives little credit, in part because it has not leveraged these initiatives in the global forum where a vacuum has been created by the inaction of US congress, To provide leadership, however, is seen as breaking solidarity with the developing country position in the talks.
‗Yes' in regional organizations where China has led the expansion of regional FTAs agreements and cooperated in trade and financial forums but is offended by the hedging strategies of its neighbors in both the economic and security forums; recent assertiveness on border issues has also been counter-productive as noted earlier.
In this summary the pattern is ‗Yes, but….' Yes, there is little evidence that China undermines or reshapes the global order where its behavior now has consequences -footdragging in the Doha round, blocking (along with others) OECD country positions in the climate change talks and aggressively trying to frustrate price setting of key commodities in international markets. It has largely played by the existing rules of multilateralism and its role is largely constructive. In the Asian region China has been receptive to its neighbors' economic initiatives.
But…there is a significant contradiction between China's continuing ambivalence about assuming a role commensurate with the world's second-largest economy and leveraging its economic strength as powerful internal interests are pushing to do. Chinese economists argue that China still lacks the capabilities to take more responsibility for the system from which it has drawn such benefit. China is uncomfortable with multilateralism and prefers bilateral diplomacy or small groups, where it is quite active. Thus, one possible outcome of the new confidence may be less attachment to the multilateral institutions. Will they be seen as having served their purpose in providing frameworks useful to China's growth and modernization but of limited relevance to a booming state-led Chinese economy?
There are several risks in such a scenario. One is that China might overplay its hand. This is not the first time the United States has been in apparent decline before rebounding because of its economic flexibility and political resilience. This time may be different but it is too soon to count the United States out. At the same time, China should not under-estimate its domestic economic challenges. Continued reliance on the Plan could be its Achilles heel. So far the outlines of the 12 th Plan seem to rely heavily on the proven interventionist capabilities of the Chinese state to bring about structural change rather than on market forces. Will intervention work in encouraging people to consume more? The answer is far from clear. Further, China's goals for international financial influence and economic power will depend on opening the capital account and greater exchange rate flexibility. Before either can happen, China needs a modern financial sector and an independent central bank, neither of which seems to be in the cards. Still, for different reasons China, too, could surprise us.
These questions spill over to the second risk --for the global economic order. Politics matter, too. It has been argued that the recipe for a peaceful transition in the global power structure is for the incumbent to accommodate the newcomer and for the newcomer to adhere to the existing rules. Mutual trust is necessary for this proposition to be realized. The Chinese fear that a declining United States will block China's rise. US interests mistrusts China's intentions. States were to allow itself to be constrained by observing the global rules in order to constrain
China.
In conclusion it should be no surprise that the spectacular speed and magnitude of China's rise disturbs the global status quo in unexpected ways and creates external expectations of China that it is not yet prepared or capable of satisfying. Nevertheless, a more assertive China creates a new, more complicated, normal that replaces the relative simplicity of America's ‗unipolar moment'. The established global framework has much to commend it to China's leaders but their adherence or contributions to strengthen the global order will for the foreseeable future depend heavily on US behavior and, more importantly, on US investment in confidence building that is essential to a stable long-term relationship with an ancient civilization which has returned to global pre-eminence.
